[plug] Re: [Absolutely, Totally, and in All Ways OT] Muslim Xmas

[Peter J. Nicol]

>  The big chasm happening with islam has its roots about 150-200 years
>  and the rise of the Wahibi(sp?) sect. Basically previously to that the
>  big tradition in Islam was whats refered to as "reasoned struggle".
>  Essentially a scholarly aproach to the religeon. Much of the theology was
strongly
>  aristotlean with a muslim-y edge to it. However the Wahibi sect
rejecected
>  this and felt that all the stuff that had happened since mohammed died
was
>  crap and tried to go to a strict strict strict Quoran reading. That meant
rejecting the
>  thoughts of the disciples and all the philosopher dudes afterwoods.

Anyone know if the Wahhabi's use Linux?   <--- lame attempt to keep
discussion on topic

GROUND ZERO AND THE SAUDI CONNECTION
THE SPECTATOR 22 September 2001

Stephen Schwartz on the extreme Islamic sect that inspires Osama bin Laden
as well as all Muslim  suicide bombers - and is subsidised by Saudi Arabia

The first thing to do when trying to understand 'Islamic suicide bombers' is
to forget the clichés  about the Muslim taste for martyrdom. It does exist,
of course, but the desire for paradise is not  a safe guide to what
motivated the appalling suicide attacks on New York and Washington last
week.  Throughout history, political extremists of all faiths have willingly
given up their lives simply  in the belief that by doing so, whether in
bombings or in other forms of terror, they would change  the course of
history, or at least win an advantage for their cause. Tamils are not
Muslims, but  they blow themselves up in their war on the government of Sri
Lanka; Japanese kamikaze pilots in  the Second World War were not Muslims,
but they flew their fighters into US aircraft carriers.

The Islamofascist ideology of Osama bin Laden and those closest to him, such
as the Egyptian and  Algerian 'Islamic Groups', is no more intrinsically
linked to Islam or Islamic civilisation than  Pearl Harbor was to Buddhism,
or Ulster terrorists - whatever they may profess - are to  Christianity.
Serious Christians don't go around killing and maiming the innocent; devout
Muslims  do not prepare for paradise by hanging out in strip bars and
getting drunk, as one of last week's  terrorist pilots was reported to have
done.

The attacks of 11 September are simply not compatible with orthodox Muslim
theology, which  cautions soldiers 'in the way of Allah' to fight their
enemies face-to-face, without harming  non-combatants, women or children.
Most Muslims, not only in America and Britain, but in the  world, are
clearly law-abiding citizens of their countries - a point stressed by
President Bush  and other American leaders, much to their credit. Nobody on
this side of the water wants a repeat  of the lamented 1941 internment of
Japanese Americans.

Still, the numerical preponderance of Muslims as perpetrators of these
ghastly incidents is no  coincidence. So we have to ask ourselves what has
made these men into the monsters they are? What  has so galvanised violent
tendencies in the world's second-largest religion (and, in America, the
fastest growing faith)? Can it really flow from a quarrel over a bit of land
in the Middle East?

For Westerners, it seems natural to look for answers in the distant past,
beginning with the  Crusades. But if you ask educated, pious, traditional
but forward-looking Muslims what has driven  their umma, or global
community, in this direction, many of them will answer you with one word:
Wahhabism. This is a strain of Islam that emerged not at the time of the
Crusades,nor even at the  time of the anti-Turkish wars of the 17th century,
but less than two centuries ago. It is violent,  it is intolerant, and it is
fanatical beyond measure. It originated in Arabia, and it is the  official
theology of the Gulf states. Wahhabism is the most extreme form of Islamic
fundamentalism, and its followers are called Wahhabis.

Not all Muslims are suicide bombers, but all Muslim suicide bombers are
Wahhabis - except,  perhaps, for some disciples of atheist leftists posing
as Muslims in the interests of personal  power, such as Yasser Arafat or
Saddam Hussein. Wahhabism is the Islamic equivalent of the most  extreme
Protestant sectarianism. It is puritan, demanding punishment for those who
enjoy any form  of music except the drum, and severe punishment up to death
for drinking or sexual transgressions.  It condemns as unbelievers those who
do not pray, a view that never previously existed in  mainstream Islam.

It is stripped-down Islam, calling for simple, short prayers, undecorated
mosques, and the  uprooting of gravestones (since decorated mosques and
graveyards lend themselves to veneration,  which is idolatry in the Wahhabi
mind). Wabhabis do not even permit the name of the Prophet  Mohammed to be
inscribed in mosques, nor do they allow his birthday to be celebrated. Above
all,  they hate ostentatious spirituality, much as Protestants detest the
veneration of miracles and  saints in the Roman Church.

Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-92), the founder of this totalitarian Islamism, was
born in Uyaynah, in the  part of Arabia known as Nejd, where Riyadh is
today, and which the Prophet himself notably warned  would be a source of
corruption and confusion. (Anti-Wahhabi Muslims refer to Wahhabism as fitna
an Najdiyyah or 'the trouble out of Nejd'.) From the beginning of Wahhab's
dispensation, in the  late 18th century, his cult was associated with the
mass murder of all who opposed it. For  example, the Wabhabis fell upon the
city of Oarbala in 1801 and killed 2,000 ordinary citizens in  the streets
and markets.

In the 19th century, Wahhabism took the form of Arab nationalism v. the
Turks. The founder of the  Saudi kingdom, Ibn Saud, established Wahhabism as
its official creed. Much has been made of the  role of the US in 'creating'
Osama bin Laden through subsidies to the Afghan mujahedin, but as  much or
more could be said in reproach of Britain which, three generations before,
supported the  Wahhabi Arabs in their revolt against the Ottomans. Arab
hatred of the Turks fused with Wahhabi  ranting against the 'decadence' of
Ottoman Islam. The truth is that the Ottoman khalifia reigned  over a
multinational Islamic umma in which vast differences in local culture and
tradition were  tolerated. No such tolerance exists in Wahhabism, which is
why the concept of US troops on Saudi  soil so inflames bin Laden.

Bin Laden is a Wahhabi. So are the suicide bombers in Israel. So are his
Egyptian allies, who  exulted as they stabbed foreign tourists to death at
Luxor not many years ago, bathing in blood up  to their elbows and emitting
blasphemous cries of ecstasy. So are the Algerian Islamist terrorists  whose
contribution to the purification of the world consisted of murdering people
for such sins as  running a movie projector or reading secular newspapers.
So are the Taleban-style guerrillas in  Kashmir who murder Hindus. The
Iranians are not Wahhabis, which partially explains their slow but
undeniable movement towards moderation and normality after a period of
utopian and puritan  revivalism. But the Taleban practise a variant of
Wahhabism. In the Wahhabi fashion they employ  ancient punishments - such as
execution for moral offences - and they have a primitive and fearful  view
of women. The same is true of Saudi Arabia's rulers. None of this extremism
has been inspired  by American fumblings in the world, and it has little to
do with the tragedies that have beset  Israelis and Palestinians.

But the Wahhabis have two weaknesses of which the West is largely unaware;
an Achilles' heel on  each foot, so to speak. The first is that the vast
majority of Muslims in the world are peaceful  people who would prefer the
installation of Western democracy in their own countries. They loathe
Wahhabism for the same reason any patriarchal culture rejects a violent
break with tradition. And  that is the point that must be understood: bin
Laden and other Wahhabis are not defending Islamic  tradition; they
represent an ultra-radical break in the direction of a sectarian utopia.
Thus,  they are best described as Islamofascists, although they have much in
common with Bolsheviks.

The Bengali Sufi writer Zeeshan Ali has described the situation touchingly:
'Muslims from  Bangladesh in the US. just like any other place in the world,
uphold the traditional beliefs of  Islam but, due to lack of instruction,
keep quiet when their beliefs are attacked by Wahhabis in  the US who all of
a sudden become "better" Muslims than others. These Wahhabis go even further
and  accuse their own fathers of heresy. sin and unbelief. And the young
children of the immigrants,  when they grow up in this country, get exposed
only to this one-sided version of Islam and are led  to think that this is
the only Islam. Naturally a big gap is being created every day that silence
is only widening.' The young, divided between tradition and the call of the
new, opt for 'Islamic  revolution' and commit themselves to their
self-destruction, combined with mass murder.

The same influences are brought to bear throughout the ten-million-strong
Muslim community in  America, as well as those in Europe. In the US, 80 per
cent of mosques are estimated by the Sufi  Hisharn al-Kabbani, born in
Lebanon and now living in the US, to be under the control of Wahhabi  imams,
who preach extremism, and this leads to the other point of vulnerability:

Wahhabism is subsidised by Saudi Arabia, even though bin Laden has sworn to
destroy the Saudi  royal family. The Saudis have played a double game for
years, more or less as Stalin did with the  West during the second world
war. They pretended to be allies in a common struggle against Saddam
Hussein while they spread Wahhabi ideology everywhere Muslims are to be
found, just as Stalin  promoted an 'antifascist' coalition with the US while
carrying out espionage and subversion on  American territory. The motive was
the same: the belief that the West was or is decadent and  doomed.

One major question is never asked in American discussions of Arab terrorism:
what is the role of  Saudi Arabia? The question cannot be asked because
American companies depend too much on the  continued flow of Saudi oil,
while American politicians have become too cosy with the Saudi  rulers.

Another reason it is not asked is that to expose the extent of Saudi and
Wahhabi influence on  American Muslims would deeply compromise many Islamic
clerics in the US. But it is the most  significant question Americans should
be asking themselves today. If we get rid of bin Laden, who  do we then have
to deal with? The answer was eloquently put by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr,
professor of  political science at the University of California at San
Diego, and author of an authoritative  volume on Islamic extremism in
Pakistan, when he said: 'If the US wants to do something about  radical
Islam, it has to deal with Saudi Arabia. The "rogue states" [Iraq, Libya,
etc.] are less  important in the radicalisation of Islam than Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is the single most  important cause and supporter of
radicalisation, ideologisation, and the general fanaticisation of  Islam.'

>From what we now know, it appears not a single one of the suicide pilots in
New York and  Washington was Palestinian. They all seem to have been Saudis,
citizens of the Gulf states,  Egyptian or Algerian. Two are reported to have
been the sons of the former second secretary of the  Saudi embassy in
Washington. They were planted in America long before the outbreak of the
latest  Palestinian intifada; in fact, they seem to have begun their
conspiracy while the Middle East  peace process was in full, if short,
bloom. Anti-terror experts and politicians in the West must  now consider
the Saudi connection.

Stephen Schwartz is the author of Intellectuals and Assassins, published by
Anthem Press.