[plug] Fwd: Who Defines Evil? Filtering Software report from Kaiser!

[Leon Brooks]

Bottom line: filtering doesn't work (surprise).

----------  Forwarded Message  ----------

Subject: Fwd: Who Defines Evil? Filtering Software report from Kaiser!
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 08:06:47 +0800
From: Bryn Jones <DESPAMMED>
To: "echalk List" <DESPAMMED>

>Forwarded from a US educatores list FYI

>Subject:  [WWWEDU] Who Defines Evil?

>Who Defines Evil?

>Statement Regarding the Kaiser Family Foundation Study on How
>Filtering Affects Access to Health Information

>On December 10th, 2002, the Kaiser Family Foundation issued a new
>study, See No Evil: How Internet Filters Affect the Search for
>Online Information. This study is available on their site at
>http://www.kff.org

>Kaiser researchers studied the issue of youth access to health
>information when filtering software has been installed. Kaiser
>studied the six leading filtering products that are used in U.S.
>public schools, SmartFilter, 8e6, Websense, CyberPatrol,
>Symantec, and N2H2, along with AOL Parental Controls.

>They assessed the ability to access sites containing health
>information across a broad range of topics, including health
>topics unrelated to sex, health topics that relate to sexual body
>parts, health topics related to sex, and sites presenting
>potentially controversial health information

>The six filters used in public schools were set at three
>different configurations: least restrictive -- blocking only the
>pornography-related category or categories; intermediate
>restrictive -- blocking those categories that are most likely to
>be considered inappropriate; and most restrictive -- blocking all
>categories conceivable in a library or school setting. Most
>public schools have configured their filtering systems at or
>above the intermediate restrictive configuration.

>Kaiser researchers also tested the systems ability to block
>access to pornography under conditions simulating intentional
>access and accidental access. To investigate accidental access,
>they attempted to access the pornography sites that appeared in
>the search results when they were seeking appropriate health
>information.

>Under conditions simulating intentional access, 1 in 10 sites
>containing pornography were accessible. This failure rate was
>consistent across the blocking configurations. (Least 87%;
>Intermediate 90%; Most 91%) Consider how long it would take a
>student or staff member at an unsupervised computer to test 10
>pornography sites to find the 1 unblocked site. If schools do not
>have effective supervision and engage in regular review of
>blocked URL reports, such intentional attempted access would go
>undetected. U.S. public schools are spending billions of dollars
>for approximately 2 minutes of protection.

>Under conditions simulating accidental access, the filters
>allowed access to pornography 38% of the times -- 1 in 3 times.
>Educators and parents who think that filters will protect Suzie
>from accidentally accessing pornography when she is searching for
>information on kitties should think again.

>Kaiser found across all of the health information that filters
>set at the least restrictive level blocked only 1.4% of the
>health information sites. Filters blocked only 5% of such sites
>at the intermediate level. Filters blocked 24% of such sites at
>the most restrictive level.

>However, a closer analysis of the data reveals blocking patterns
>that present significantly greater concerns. In those categories
>where the subject area is controversial or the sites themselves
>may contain controversial information, the rate of overblocking
>was significantly higher. The categories that stood out included
>safe sex, homosexuality, and drugs. At the intermediate
>restriction configuration, typical of most school settings, the
>filters blocked 1 in 4 of the health information sites in these
>subject areas. (Look closely at the table on page 10 of the
>Kaiser report to evaluate this information.)

>The Kaiser study demonstrates the reasons why it is both unwise
>and inappropriate to place reliance on filtering software to
>protect young people when they are using the Internet.

>A full analysis of this report will be available in the near
>future on both of the following web sites:

>Nancy Willard, M.S., J.D.
>Research Associate, Center for Advanced Technology in Education
>University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403
>URL: http//netizen.uoregon.edu
>E-Mail: nwillard at oregon.uoregon.edu

>Director, Responsible Netizen Institute
>P.O. Box 50412, Eugene, Oregon 97405
>URL: http://responsiblenetizen.org
>E-Mail: nwillard at responsiblenetizen.org

(541) 344-9125


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--Bryn Jones - ADE 2002
--ICTPD Course	  http://ictpd.net
--Phone Home: (08)9335 7036  email: DESPAMMED
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